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New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange
By ITAI ASHLAGI AND ALVIN E. ROTH∗
A kidney transplant is the treatment of choice
for end stage renal disease, but over 90,000 pa-
tients are waiting for a cadaver kidney in the
U.S., and fewer than 11,000 such transplants are
performed annually. Live donation is also possi-
ble, and there are now more live than deceased
donors each year in the U.S., although they still
account for fewer than 6,500 transplants a year
(since living donors only donate one kidney).
And having a healthy willing live donor is not
enough: sometimes a donor’s kidney is incom-
patible with the intended recipient, either be-
cause of blood type or immunological incom-
patibilities. Incompatibility between donor and
intended recipient creates the demand for kidney
exchange (aka kidney paired donation): an in-
compatible patient-donor pair can donate a kid-
ney to a compatible recipient and receive a kid-
ney from a compatible donor.
The first kidney exchange was in Korea (J.Y.
Kwak et al. (1999)), where the high frequency
of blood types A and B make exchanges due to
blood type incompatibility readily available (an
A-B pair exchanging with a B-A pair, where X-
Y denotes a patient of blood type X and donor
of blood type Y), more than in the U.S. where
blood type B is relatively rare. The first kidney
exchange in the U.S., in New England in 2000,
also involved two blood type incompatible pairs
(see Bradley C. Wallis et al. (2011) for history
and references). And for most patients on the
waiting list for cadaver kidneys, blood type de-
termines compatibility with a given donor. Only
10% of those 90,000 patients are “highly sen-
sitized,” meaning they are immunologically in-
compatible with more than 80% of donors with
compatible blood type.
But the patients enrolled in the most ac-
tive kidney exchange networks are much more
highly sensitized: in the four exchange networks
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with which we have worked, the percentage of
highly sensitized patients is from 50%-80% of
those enrolled (Ashlagi, David Gamarnik and
Roth (2011)). The present paper considers why
this is the case, and its consequences.
While the first proposal for organizing kidney
exchange on a large scale involved exchanges
organized as both cycles and chains, logistical
constraints required that the initial exchanges
conducted by the New England Program for
Kidney Exchange, the Alliance for Paired Do-
nation and other networks were between just
two patient-donor pairs (Roth, Tayfun So¨nmez
and M. Utku U¨nver (2004,2005a,b) ).1 Sub-
sequent work suggested that as patient pools
grew larger, expanding the infrastructure to al-
low only slightly larger, 3- and 4-way exchanges
would be efficient (Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver
(2007a)). But the prevalence of highly sensi-
tized patients among those enrolled in kidney
exchange has brought long chains back into the
picture in an important way, after the introduc-
tion of non-simultaneous chains initiated by a
non-directed donor (Roth et al. (2006), Michael
Rees et al. (2009)). Chains now contribute
many of the kidney exchanges performed by all
of the largest multi-hospital networks. The use-
fulness of chains turns out to be closely related
to the highly sensitized patient population. And
one of several causes of the high percentage
of highly sensitized patients is that many large
transplant centers are withholding their easy-to-
match patient-donor pairs, and only enrolling
their hard-to-match pairs. This reduces the total
number of transplants that can be achieved, par-
ticularly for the most highly sensitized patients.2
1In addition to those two large kidney exchange clearing-
houses, kidney exchange today is practiced by a growing number
of hospitals and consortia. Computer scientists have become in-
volved, and an algorithm of David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum and
Tuomas Sandholm (2007) designed to handle large populations
is used in the UNOS (United Network for Organ Sharing) pilot
program for a national exchange.
2For example, the UNOS kidney exchange program was be-
gun in 2010 and through the end of 2011 it had accomplished
only 17 transplants, from a small pool of enrolled patient-donor
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(Another reason the patient pool becomes highly
sensitized is that sensitized patients remain un-
matched longer, and build up in the patient pool,
but the data show even the initially enrolled pa-
tients are highly sensitized.)
There are several reasons why hospitals wish
to conduct their own exchanges for easy-to-
match pairs, including compatible pairs in
which the donor can donate to the intended pa-
tient.3 These include the difficult logistics of co-
ordinating with other hospitals, paying for the
tests that establish donor-recipient compatibility
before knowing who the recipient will be (Rees
et al. (2012)), and, finally, the fact that presently
used matching algorithms do not make it indi-
vidually rational (IR) for hospitals to enroll all
their pairs, since they do not guarantee each hos-
pital that enrolling all its patients will allow it
to perform as many transplants as it could get
by enrolling only some patients and doing some
exchanges internally among its own patients.
The initial papers on kidney exchange focused
on incentives for patients and their surgeons,
but the current problems facing kidney exchange
arise from the fact that hospitals have become
the main players, and have different strategy sets
than individuals, since directors of transplant
centers deal with multiple patient-donor pairs.
Section I considers how the current algorithms
fail to make it safe for hospitals to enroll all their
pairs, and how this could be fixed.
Section II considers why long chains play
such an important role. Exchange pools are
modeled as compatibility graphs whose vertices
are incompatible pairs with directed links in-
dicating compatibility between donors and pa-
tients. Previous studies focused on the rel-
atively dense compatibility graphs that would
arise if blood type incompatibilities were dom-
inant, rather than the sparse graphs correspond-
ing to many highly sensitized patients.
I. Individual rationality and incentives for
hospitals to participate fully
Most kidney exchange clearinghouses try to
maximize the (weighted) number of transplants
pairs, despite having many affiliated hospitals.
3Failure to enroll compatible pairs in kidney exchange not
only deprives those pairs of the possibility of a better matched
kidney, it also exacerbates the shortage of blood type O donors
who are blood type compatible with all patients.
without attention to whether some incompatible
pairs can be internally matched by the hospitals
that entered them into the database. Thus, it may
not be IR for a hospital to contribute those pairs
it can match internally (see e.g. Roth (2008)).4
For example, consider a hospital A with two
pairs, a1 and a2, that it can match internally.
Suppose it enters those two pairs in a centralized
exchange. It may be that the weighted number of
transplants is maximized by including a1 in an
exchange but not a2, in which case only one of
hospital A’s patients will be transplanted, when
it could have performed two transplants on its
own.
An allocation (set of disjoint exchanges) is IR
if no hospital can internally match more pairs
than the number of its pairs matched in the al-
location. In Ashlagi and Roth (2011) we show
that efficiency and individual rationality cannot
always be satisfied simultaneously.5 However,
we also show constructively, in a model based on
Erdos-Renyi graphs, that this is not an issue in
large exchange pools; under minor assumptions,
as the number of hospitals grows (the compati-
bility graph grows), with probability tending to
one there exists an -efficient allocation that is
(i) IR and (ii) doesn’t use exchanges of size more
than 3.6
However limit theorems do not address pa-
tient populations of clinically relevant size, and
so we report simulations that show the limit re-
sults are achieved in populations of the size we
presently see. These simulations suggest that
considerable gains could be achieved by adopt-
ing an IR mechanism.
Simulations. For each iteration we generate
compatibility graphs as follows. According to
blood type and sensitivity (PRA) distributions
consistent with the UNOS population (see e.g.
Ashlagi and Roth (2011)), a patient and 1-3 re-
lated donors are drawn uniformly. We then test
tissue type compatibility between the patient and
her donors using the patient’s PRA (which is a
probability of incompatibility). A patient and
one of her related donors join the pool (as an
incompatible pair) if the patient is incompatible
4Some weighted matching algorithms put some weight on
internal exchanges, but this does not solve the problem.
5Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver (2007b) first showed that no strat-
egyproof mechanism is efficient.
6Panos Toulis and David C. Parkes (2012) show a similar
result assuming exchanges are limited to size 2.
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with all her related donors. In addition, a non-
directed donor is generated randomly. To com-
plete the graph, tissue type tests are conducted
between donors and patients of different pairs.
Finally, we associate each incompatible pair and
each non-directed donor to a random hospital.
We compare an algorithm like those currently
in use, max-match, to an IR mechanism, IR-
match. Two behaviors by hospitals are consid-
ered: (i) truth-telling - the hospital reports all
its pairs, and (ii) withhold internal matches - the
hospital withholds a maximum set of pairs it can
internally match.
Each row of Table 1 corresponds to a scenario.
The first scenario includes 10 hospitals, and 100
pairs. The ratio between the number of matches
a given hospital,H , obtains from withholding to
the number of matches H obtains from report-
ing truthfully, given that all other hospitals re-
port truthfully, is given in the third column (un-
der the max-match algorithm) and the sixth col-
umn (under the IR-match algorithm). Thus, it is
beneficial for H to withhold its internal matches
under max-match, but not under IR-match.7 The
maximum number of matches that can possibly
be obtained is given in the fourth column (under
max-match when all hospitals report truthfully).
The number of matches obtained when all hos-
pitals withhold their internal matches is given in
the fifth column. Finally, the number of matches
obtained when all hospitals report truthfully un-
der IR-match is given in the last column.
To summarize, (i) a hospital profits from with-
holding its internal matches under max-match
but not under IR-match, (ii) more than 10%
more matches will be achieved under truthful-
reporting under IR-match than under max-match
assuming hospitals withhold internal matches
and (iii) the cost of using IR-match is very small
even assuming all hospitals report truthfully un-
der max-match, and the gain from using IR-
match is substantial if hospitals withhold under
max-match (assuming they report truthfully un-
der IR-match).
Individual rationality alone is insufficient to
guarantee full participation: hospitals may have
incentives to withhold overdemanded pairs other
than internal matches (for example, an A-O pair
is overdemanded since there are fewer such pairs
7When all other hospitals withhold their pairs, the gain under
max-match for hospital H increases to more than 10%.
than O-A pairs due to blood type compatibility).
Intuitively, if hospital A has an overdemanded
pair a1 that it can internally match to pair a2 or
a3 that are each underdemanded, individual ra-
tionality constraints alone may still leave hospi-
tal A better off withholding a1, and waiting to
see if one of its underdemanded pairs, a2 or a3,
is unmatched by the mechanism and then inter-
nally matching that pair to a1. In Ashlagi and
Roth (2011) we introduce an “almost” efficient
mechanism which makes truthful reporting an -
Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the number of partic-
ipating hospitals grows large.
II. The need for long chains
For large dense compatibility graphs, there is
almost always an efficient allocation as in Fig-
ure 1 (see Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver (2007a) and
Ashlagi and Roth (2011)). Exchanges of size
more than 3 are not needed. Furthermore Roth,
So¨nmez and U¨nver (2007a) showed via simu-
lations that even on small exchange pools ex-
changes of size more than 3 do not add many
transplants. These simulations show (as does
the related theory) that each non-directed donor
can increase the number of transplants by at
most three. But current exchange programs have
many highly sensitized patients, and thus have
sparser graphs than graphs generated from the
statistics of the general patient population.
Ashlagi, Gamarnik and Roth (2011) provide
empirical evidence that longer exchanges and
long chains increase efficiency, and provide a
theoretical framework based on sparse Erdos-
Renyi graphs. Intuitively, if a patient p is highly
sensitized and can receive a kidney from very
few donors, the chance that p will be part of a
short exchange is small (and including a small
exchange even if one exists might be inefficient).
Previous papers explicitly or implicitly ignored
tissue-type compatibility implying that graphs
are dense. Ashlagi, Gamarnik and Roth (2011)
suggest that tissue type compatibility cannot be
neglected. They show that for sparse graphs,
longer exchanges and longer chains increase
the number of transplants linearly as the graph
grows. They use simulations to show that their
results give a good approximation also in small
graphs.8
8Ashlagi et al. (2011a,b) use simulations to show that long
chains increase efficiency in a dynamic setting. John P. Dicker-
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max-match IR match
hospitals pairs H’s gain truthful reporting withholding H’s gain truthful reporting
#matches #matches #matches
10 100 1.055 52 (12.9) 43 (8) 0.994 51.6
12 120 1.066 65 (17.2) 54 (11) 0.995 64 (16.6)
15 150 1.061 84 (23.8) 71 (16) 0.988 83.5 (23)
20 200 1.048 117 (36) 101 (26) 0.986 116.6 (34.9)
Table 1: Withholding internal matches vs. reporting truthfully in max-match and IR-match.
Figure 1: The structure of an efficient allocation without altruistic donors. All selfdemanded pairs are matched to each other. All B-A
pairs are matched to A-B (assuming more B-As than A-Bs), the remainder of the A-B pairs are matched in 3-way exchanges using
O-A’s and B-O’s. AB-O are matched in 3-ways each using two overdemanded pairs, and every other overdemanded pair is matched to
an underdemanded pair.
Below we report simulations of the effective-
ness of long chains. Graphs are generated as
in the previous simulations, except we gener-
ate more highly sensitized patients by assum-
ing each patient has 3-7 potential related donors;
each patient is tested for compatibility with each
related donor (this generates a pool with approx-
imately 60% high PRA patients). The advantage
of longer exchanges and chains is clear from Ta-
ble 2 (see also Dickerson et al. (2012) who for
similar findings).
Each row in the table corresponds to a differ-
ent scenario. In the first three scenarios there are
100 pairs (with an average of 62.5 high PRA pa-
tients) and the number of non-directed donors is
either 2 or 6. The third through seventh columns
each describe the number of matches obtained
(and in parentheses the number of highly sen-
sitized matches) under different matching algo-
rithms - (k, l) means we search for the maxi-
mum number of transplants allowing exchanges
(cycles) up to size k and chains up to size l.
Thus, with 100 pairs and 2 non-directed donors,
an average of 44.48 matches were found when
searching for matches using cycles of length at
most 3 and chains of length 3.
III. Conclusion
Kidney exchange programs are maturing, yet
progress is still slow. This note describes
son, Ariel D. Procaccia and Sandholm et al. (2012) support these
findings with further simulations).
some major issues facing kidney exchange to-
day and suggests solutions that may signifi-
cantly increase the number of transplants. First,
transplant centers withhold their easy to match
patient-donor pairs, and we suggest modifying
the commonly used matching mechanisms to
make it IR for hospitals to participate with all
their patients. This applies to compatible as well
as incompatible pairs. Blood types cause some
pairs to be overdemanded and others to be un-
derdemanded. Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver (2005a)
showed that a significant increase in the number
of kidney exchanges could be achieved by al-
lowing compatible pairs to participate (see also
So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) who analyze graphs
with compatible pairs). Second, due to the
highly sensitized pools and their sizes, allowing
long chains will significantly increase the num-
ber of transplants, especially for highly sensi-
tized patients.
As kidney exchange grew the set of players
changed. To foster further growth the design of
kidney exchange clearinghouses must respond.
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